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Buck: ADR Provisions to Inoculate the Vaccine Industry from Governmenta

ADR PROVISIONS TO INOCULATE THE VACCINE INDUSTRY
FROM GOVERNMENTAL IP TAKINGS
Mark Buck1
I. INTRODUCTION
It started with a cough.2 It continued with a fever.3 After several days of treatment
with over-the-counter medications without improvement, it became clear that Victor
Villarroel Saavedra, an unvaccinated but otherwise in good health Bolivian physician, had
contracted COVID-19 in the summer of 2020.4 By this point, Victor’s options were limited:
seek at-home care or go to the hospital.5 After a few days of in-home care with nasal canal
oxygen and nursing/physician oversight, he was eventually transferred to a hospital where he
passed within the week.6 This all could have been avoided with a simple jab in the otherwise
healthy man, which would have nearly eliminated his risk of death and significantly reduced
his risk of hospitalization.7 However, Bolivia is without vaccinations originating from most
developed countries (MDC) such as the US, UK, CAN, or from the EU, although its
government has tried to obtain them.8 Distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine to least
developed countries (LDCs) like Bolivia has been sluggish to non-existent, leading to the
needless deaths of many of the world’s most medically vulnerable populations.9
The lack of vaccination availability to LDC from the US, UK, CAN, or from the EU
through existing international patent agreements has not gone unnoticed on the world stage.
In response to this, some have argued for governments, in the name of national security, to
just take the COVID-19 IP and mass produce the vaccine without paying for it.10 This article
will explore how pandemics generally are a recurring problem, and why this would be a poor
long-term solution to them. Further, the article will evaluate the current programs targeting
this problem and their shortcomings. As an alternative to the unworkable programs, this
1

B.S., United States Military Academy, 2005; M.E., Texas A&M University; D.O., Midwestern University,
2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2023; Associate Member, Journal of Dispute
Resolution, 2021-2022. I am grateful to Professor Lietzan for her insight, guidance, and support during the
writing of this Note, as well as the Journal of Dispute Resolution for its help in the editing process.
2
Victor Villarroel Saavedra et al., Stories From the Field The Heavy Toll of COVID-19 in Bolivia: A Tale of
Distrust, Despair, and Health Inequalities, 104(5) AM. J. TROP. MED. HYG. 1607 (2021).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
7
Kathy Katella, Comparing the COVID-19 Vaccines: How Are They Different, YALE MEDICINE (Feb. 18,
2022), https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/covid-19-vaccine-comparison.
8
Sputnik V: From vaccine hope to frustration for Latin America, EURACTIV (Aug. 4, 2021),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/sputnik-v-from-vaccine-hope-to-frustration-for-latinamerica/.
9
EURACTIV, supra note 8; WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://covid19.who.int/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
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Nancy Jecker & Caeser Atuire, What’s yours is ours: waiving intellectual property protections for COVID19 vaccines, 47(9) J. MED. ETHICS 595 (2021).
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article explores solutions grounded in the principles of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
rather than using current international patent agreement mechanisms to ensure access to MDC
based vaccines for LDCs.11 Lastly, the article will discuss various ADR-inspired proposals to
bridge the vaccine requirement gaps while still respecting the vaccine maker’s intellectual
property (IP).
This article is divided into four parts. Section II will discuss the problems of the
current state of vaccine disruption. Section III will discuss the issues with current solutions to
the distribution problem to include free market approach, nongovernmental programs, and
finally use of compulsory licensing and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) agreement regarding US and Canada. Section IV will look at alternative
dispute resolution inspired solutions via real time aggressive negation of lower prices against
the backdrop of TRIPS, the creation of a pandemic like insurance market modeled on the US
flood insurance program, and lastly, pre-negotiated purchasing partnerships with most
developed countries.
II. THE PROBLEM: LACK OF INITIAL DISTRIPUTION OF COVID-19 TO LDC
As of 2021, nearly eight billion people call the Earth home.12 That number is
increasing at an exponential rate.13 During a worldwide pandemic, an overwhelming
percentage of those eight billion people will need at least one dose, if not multiple doses, of a
potential vaccine to ensure protection of all humans on Earth.14 As we saw during the current
pandemic, the COVID-19 appearance started a race with two legs to it. In the first leg, bench
scientist raced the clock to develop vaccines as fast and safely as possible. Then in the second
leg of race the bench scientists passed the baton to the engineers to create the needed eight
billion doses as quickly as possible.15 The consequences of even a single day’s delay meant
numerous deaths worldwide.16
Given the seriousness of the COVID-19 pandemic, the bench research scientist
wasted no time in the first leg of the race creating an approved COVID-19 jab.17 The World
Health Organization (WHO) formally identified COVID-19 in January 2020, beginning the
COVID-19 vaccine race.18 China approved the world’s first vaccine in May 2020.19 Russia

11
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, World Health Org. Dir.-Gen., WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at
148th session of the Executive Board (Jan. 18, 2021) (transcript available at https://www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-148th-session-of-the-executive-board).
12
Current World Population, WORLDOMETERS, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2022).
13
Id.
14
Shrikanth Sampath et al., Pandemics Throughout the History, 13(9) CUREUS 2 (2021).
15
Smriti Mallapaty, China’s Coronavac Jab Set to Boosts Global Immunization Campaign, 594 NATURE 162
(2021).
16
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Deaths, OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths (last
visited Mar. 15, 2022).
17
Joint Report, WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part, 9 (Jan. 14 – Feb. 10,
2021).
18
Id.
19
See Mallapaty, supra note 15.
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approved its first vaccine on August 11, 2020.20 The US approved England’s Pfizer vaccine in
December of 2020. 21 The FDA gave initial approval to the United States’ Moderna vaccine
December 19, 2020.22 The development of an effective vaccine in record time was a
technological marvel and credit to modern science.23
However, the second leg of the race, commercial vaccine manufacturing, was not
nearly as expedited at the vaccine creation.24 Indeed, it took another four months after vaccine
discovery to produce enough of it in the US market to ensure that half of all US adults
received at least one dose of the inoculation.25 During this period of the vaccine race where
supply is unable to keep up with demand, MDCs will generally operate in a self-interested
way, leading to reduced access to the vaccine for LDCs until MDCs feel their markets have
been saturated.26 To this point in the current pandemic, the US did not began to send their
excess supply of vaccine to LDCs until they felt their market was saturated creating nearly an
eight month delay from when the jab was introduced on the market to when LDC began to
receive excess US doses. The delay cost innumerable LDC lives who were without access to
the vaccine.27
It is not a matter of if, but when the next pandemic level event occurs, and the world
needs to be ready for it.28 Pandemics like COVID-19 happen with some regularity, but
generally only every 100 or so years.29 One only needs to take a cursory look at history to see
the metronomic recurrence of pandemic level events such as the Plague of Athens, the
Antonine Plague, the Plague of Cyprian, the Plague of Justinian, and the Black Plagues.30
More recently there has been the 1855 “Third Plague Pandemic,” which was responsible for
10 million deaths worldwide and brought the Black Plague to the US.31 In addition, the

20
Bianca Nogrady, Mounting Evidence Suggest Sputnik Covid Vaccine is Safe and Effective, 595 Nat. 339,
339, (July 15, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01813-2.
21
A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AM. J, MANAGED CARE, (last updated Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020 (last visited Mar. 15, 2022); See also
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA Approves First COVID-19 Vaccine, (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-covid-19-vaccine.
22
Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, https://www.fda.gov/emergencypreparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/moderna-covid-19vaccine#:~:text=On%20December%2018%2C%202020%2C%20the,SARS%2DCoV%2D2).
23
Joint Report, supra note 17.
24
A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, supra note 21.
25
Id.
26
Fact Sheet, The White House, President Bident Announces Major Milestone in Administration’s Global
Vaccination Efforts: More than 100 Million U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Doses Donated and Shipped Abroad,
(Aug.
3,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/03/fact-sheetpresident-biden-announces-major-milestone-in-administrations-global-vaccination-efforts-more-than-100million-u-s-covid-19-vaccine-doses-donated-and-shippedabroad/#:~:text=Today%2C%20the%20President%20will%20announce,in%20COVID%2D19%20vaccine%20
donations.
27
Adhanom Ghebreyesus T, WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at 148th session of the Executive
Board, World Health Organization (Jan. 18, 2021).
28
Sampath et al., supra note 14.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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Spanish Flu was responsible for killing at least 20 million people worldwide in the late
1910s.32 Pandemic-level infections are a fact of life.33
Further, the next pandemic could be as communicable as measles34, as deadly as
smallpox, have the long-term consequences such as paralysis seen in polio, or as perplexing
and devastating as the bubonic plague.35 Given these risks, an internationally coordinated
rapid response to the next pandemic with an equitable distribution plan that considers all
stakeholders is key. Otherwise, individual nations will do whatever they feel they have to in
order to secure vaccines for the good of their populations.36 MDCs could secure their control
over the vaccine by nationalizing the medication, ensuring foreign countries are legally
excluded from any hope of purchasing the vaccine in the open market.37 Or an MDC could
prevent export of the vaccine from wide dissemination as means to further its own national
security plan.38 Though the Geneva Convention prevents active biological warfare, it says
nothing about maximizing the effect of a naturally occurring biological agents by withholding
nationalized treatment in the name of national security.39 This mentality might lead to war as
countries fight to secure their vaccination resources.
Though, war over securing nationalized treatments is a worst case senecio, a much
more likely situation is that nationalization of vaccine IP may set a precedent that inoculation
developers will lose control of their IP and/or be excluded from various markets. Without
market forces providing the necessary economic drive for vaccine development and
dissemination, vaccine developers may be dissuaded from doing as much vaccine research as
they might have during inevitable next pandemic due to lack of compensation.40
In a hundred years or so years when the next pandemic is likely to hit, market forces
like supply and demand, the preference to avoid war, and the need for IP protections, will
remain concerns for vaccine developers. Given all these issues, the main concern is the
inability of LDCs to even attempt procurement of vaccines during the initial sale period.

32

Id.
Sampath et al., supra note 14.
34
14 Diseases You Almost Forgot About (Thanks to Vaccines), CDC (May 8, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/parents/diseases/forgot-14-diseases.html.
35
Jenny Howard, Plague was one of history’s deadliest diseases – Then we found a cure, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (July 6, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/the-plague.
36
Kai Kuperschmidt, ‘Vaccine nationalism’ threatens global plan to distribute COVID-19 shots fairly,
SCIENCE (July 28, 2020), https://www.science.org/content/article/vaccine-nationalism-threatens-global-plandistribute-covid-19-shots-fairly.
37
Id.
38
Jeffrey Gettleman et al., India Cuts Back on Vaccine Exports as Infections Surge at Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/world/asia/india-covid-vaccine-astrazeneca.html.
39
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
40
Tanley Plokin et al, The complexity and cost of vaccine manufacturing – An overview, 35 VACCINE 4064,
4065 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5518734/pdf/main.pdf; Dimitrios Gouglas et al.,
Estimating the cost of vaccine development against epidemic infectious diseases: a cost minimization study,
THE
LANCET,
6,
1386,
1386
(2018),
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2214109X%2818%2930346-2; Philip Ball, The lightning-fast quest for COVID vaccines – what it means for other
diseases, 598 NATURE 16, 16–18, Jan. 7, 2021, https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-02003626-1/d41586-020-03626-1.pdf.
33
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III. CURRENT SOLUTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND THEIR
SHORTCOMINGS
This article will evaluate four current solutions to the COVID-19 distribution. The
first is the free market approach, then class IP theory, followed by a look at the COVAX
system. Lastly the article will evaluate the compulsory license approach from the Canada and
US perspective. Free market approach, COVAX and classic IP theory mechanisms all create
too high an economic hurtle for LDCs, while a compulsory licenses approach create political
and industry disincentives for vaccine distribution to LDC. Indeed, each of these current
solutions fails to provide LDCs with a reasonable way to gain access to the vaccine during its
initial release.
A.

Free Market Approach

The traditional free market system operating under classic supply and demand
forces has led to the distribution problem of the US, UK, and EU COVID-19 vaccines.41
Under this system, only countries who can afford to pay the vaccine’s price are given access
to it.42 This causes two concerns. First, it is in everyone’s best medical interest to get as many
of the world’s inhabitants vaccinated, as universal vaccination provides the best protection
against the disease.43 Second, and of more concern in this article, there is no effort by the free
market to ensure the broadest access to the vaccine for all the world.44 Instead, access is based
on the socio-economic status of the country, allowing for a only 1% of LDC to have received
at least one dose of a vaccine as of July 1, 2019.45
To this point, before a vaccine had even been completed, numerous MDCs, with the
ready cash on hand, had already purchased at least 51% of the US, UK, CAN or EU dose
pre-order offerings.46 Indeed, some of these countries, such as Canada seemed to have
purchased more doses than they had population by a four to one margin.47 On January 18,
2021, a month after the US, UK, CAN or EU doses were approved for use, the DirectorGeneral of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, noted the disparity of the free
market’s distribution of the vaccine when he stated, “More than 39 million doses of vaccine
have now been administered in at least 49 higher-income countries. Just 25 doses have been

41

Ghebreyesus, supra note 11.
Id.
43
Frequently Asked Questions about COVID-19 Vaccination, CDC (Feb. 4, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/vaccines/faq.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019ncov%2Fvaccines%2Fkeythingstoknow.html
44
Ghebreyesus, supra note 11.
45
Ghebreyesus, supra note 11; T.V. Padma, COVID vaccines to reach poorest countries in 2022—despite
recent pledges, 598 NATURE 342, 342–43, July 15, 2021, https://media.nature.com/original/magazineassets/d41586-021-01762-w/d41586-021-01762-w.pdf.
46
Anthony D. So & Joshua Woo, Reserving coronavirus disease 2019 vaccines for global access: cross
sectional analysis, 371 BMJ m4750, 4752 (2020).
47
Id.
42
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given in one lowest-income country. Not 25 million; not 25 thousand; just 25.”48 That country
was reportedly Guinea.49
Lastly, the free-market approach leads to desperate decisions by LDCs unable to
enter the US/UK/CAN/EU vaccine market.50 For example, Bolivia agreed to purchase
vaccines from Russia out of necessity due to the effective lockout of the Western vaccine
market.51 Russia sold 5.2 million doses to Bolivia, with the first dose administered on January
28, 2021.52 Given that Bolivia has 11.2 million people, this was thought to be a good start.53
However, one has to pay careful attention to the fine print. The Russian vaccine is a two-dose
vaccine, and each dose is unique.54 Indeed, one cannot simply just get the first dose twice, or
rely on the first dose for a reasonable level of protection like a US, UK, or EU approved twodose vaccine series.55 Russia’s vaccine requires a person to receive the unique first dose and
then sometime later the unique second dose.56 The first dose alone is basically ineffective in
preventing hospitalization or death on its own.57 Proper immunization requires both doses for
efficacy.58 Unfortunately, Bolivia only contracted for the first dose, giving Bolivia 5.2 million
first doses and zero second doses; Bolivia had no money left over to contract for the second
doses.59 The lack of second dose severely compromised the country’s goal to provide
effective vaccination of its citizens.60
A pure free market approach leads to countries procuring more vaccinees than they
require, predatory practices have effectively locked out least developed countries from access
to the vaccine.61
B.

Classic IP Approach

Under classical IP theory applied to the medical field, IP protections via patents
incentivize the development of new medical treatments.62 Patents do this by trading disclosure
48

Ghebreyesus, supra note 11.
Opinion: Rich countries’ ‘me first’ vaccine hoarding is leaving behind low-income nations, THE WASH.
POST (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/rich-countries-me-firstvaccine-hoarding-is-leaving-behind-low-income-nations/2021/01/23/3830e7d4-5c23-11eb-a976bad6431e03e2_story.html.
50
Bolivia consults with experts from Spain, Argentina and Russia to combine vaccines, THE RIO TIMES (July
29, 2021), https://www.riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/covid-19/bolivia-consults-with-experts-from-spainargentina-and-russia-to-combine-vaccines/; EURACTIV, supra note 8.
51
THE RIO TIMES, supra note 50; EURACTIV, supra note 8.
52
THE RIO TIMES, supra note 50; EURACTIV, supra note 8.
53
THE RIO TIMES, supra note 50; EURACTIV, supra note 8.
54
EURACTIV, supra note 8.
55
THE RIO TIMES, supra note 50.
56
EURACTIV, supra note 8.
57
THE RIO TIMES, supra note 50.
58
EURACTIV, supra note 8.
59
THE RIO TIMES, supra note 50.
60
EURACTIV, supra note 8.
61
So & Woo, supra note 46.
62
Stanley Plotkin, The Complexity and Cost of Vaccine Manufacturing – An Overview, 35 VACCINE 4064,
4066 (2017); See Dimitrios Gouglas et al., Estimating the Cost of Vaccine Development Against Epidemic
Infectious Diseases: A Cost Minimization Study, 6 THE LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH e1386 (2018).

49

158
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2022/iss2/11

6

Buck: ADR Provisions to Inoculate the Vaccine Industry from Governmenta

ADR Provisions to Inoculate the Vaccine Industry from Governmental IP Takings
of the specific details of a new medication for a limited monopoly on that medication.63 This
monopoly is respected not just by current US patent laws, but also by international agreement
among all WTO members via the international agreements.64 In this way, a medical company
may invest heavily in numerous risky medication development with the knowledge that upon
governmental approval, it will have a predictable path to recoup its investment and turn a
profit.65 As the monopoly on the medication is for a limited time, the company is encouraged
to not rest on its laurels, but instead to reinvest any profits into further research looking for
the next breakout medication.66 Further, public disclosure of the medication via the patent
system may allow third parties to take what has been created and improve on it faster than
might have otherwise occurred.67 In these ways, patent protection encourages perpetual
development of new vaccines needed during a pandemic in the long run.68
However, the policy behind patent protection is not without issues. During the life
of a patent, the price of the medication is often super competitive. Though this super
competitive price point encourages fast vaccinee discovery, it significantly slows worldwide
distribution. Indeed, a patent’s monopoly allows for a market price point of the new
medication well beyond the means of least developed nations locking them out of the initial
distribution system as seen with the Pfizer costing upwards of $19 a dose69 leading to LDCs
only initially receiving 25 jabs.70
C.

COVAX Approach

COVAX is a vaccine distribution program based on the idea that the only way out of
the COVID-19 pandemic is by every country in the world working closely together to ensure
everyone has access to a COVID-19 vaccine.71 The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations (CEPI), unicef, Gavi, and the WHO provided the funding to create a program to
acquire and distribute, in an equitable fashion, US, UK, or EU, etc. vaccines to countries
economically locked out of the those vaccine markets.72
Though the program was met with some initial success, it had two major issues. The
first issue is that the program was designed to only provide enough vaccines to cover up to
20% of each LDC’s population.73 This is a non-solution for 80% of the population for each
participating country. The second and more pressing issue is that it has run into the same
63

Plotkin, supra note 62; Gouglas et al., supra note 62.
Plotkin, supra note 62; Gouglas et al., supra note 62.
65
Plotkin, supra note 62; Gouglas et al., supra note 62.
66
Plotkin, supra note 62; Gouglas et al., supra note 62.
67
Plotkin, supra note 62; Gouglas et al., supra note 62.
68
Plotkin, supra note 62; Gouglas et al., supra note 62.
69
Owen Dyer, Covid-19: Countries Are Learning What Others Paid for Vaccines, 372 BJM n281 (2021).
70
Editorial Board, Rich Countries’ ‘Me First’ Vaccine Hoarding is Leaving Behind Low-Income Nations, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/rich-countriesme-first-vaccine-hoarding-is-leaving-behind-low-income-nations/2021/01/23/3830e7d4-5c23-11eb-a976bad6431e03e2_story.html.
71
Benjamin Mueller & Rebecca Robbins, Where a Vast Global Vaccination Program Went Wrong, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/02/world/europe/covax-covid-vaccineproblems-africa.html.
72
Id.
73
Id.
64
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problem the LDCs ran into when they attempted to purchase the vaccine on the free market,
they could not pay the high prices the market was calling for.74 Thus, the COVAX program
was just as locked out of the vaccine purchasing market as all the other LDCs since most of
the vaccines were already spoken for by the MDCs.75
Under this market constraint created by inadequate nongovernmental agency
funding and looked at the through the MDC ‘me first’ lens, COVAX continues to find itself
unable to meet its vaccine acquisition goals, meaning countries are not even receiving the
20% they were promised, making a COVAX system a nonviable solution during the initial,
vaccine supply limited portion of the next pandemic.76
D.

Compulsory Licensee Approach
1.

WTO TRIPS Agreement

WTO member countries passed the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) at the Uruguay Round in 1990.77 This agreement was helmed by the US to
improve US IP rights, which the United States felt were lacking under previous agreements.78
In its final form, the agreement codified many US IP protections in the international trade
system.79 In doing so, the agreement defined the minimum standards for WTO member
countries to use in protection of each member country’s IP without providing a series of
carved out exceptions for IP use in LDC.80 TRIPS began to be regarded as a one-sided
agreement that placed least developed nations at a significant disadvantage in matters of
healthcare, which created international backlash.81 In response to this perception, the Doha
Declaration was released in 2001.82
The Doha Declaration created a mechanism to balance the IP rights of all WTO
member countries against the need for healthcare in least developed WTO member
countries.83 The key to achieving this balance was paragraphs four, five and six of the Doha
Declarations. Paragraph four states that the entire TRIPS agreement should be viewed through
the lens of international support of the public health for all member countries.84 In support of
a member country’s public health, paragraph five guarantees a WTO member country the
right to determine what may be considered a national emergency or an issue of extreme

74

Id.
Id.
76
Mueller & Robins, supra note 71.
77
Adrian Otten, The TRIPS negotiations: an overview, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 55, 59
(Jayshree Watal & Anthony Taubman eds., 2015).
78
Id. at 59.
79
Id. at 60.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
IP Justice Policy Paper for the WIPO Development Agenda, WIPO, (June 20, 2005),
https://archive.md/20130108183327/http://www.ipjustice.org/WIPO/WIPO_DA_IP_Justice_Policy_Paper.sht
ml.
83
Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health, WTO (Nov. 14, 2021)
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm
84
Otten, supra note 77, at 108.
75
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urgency.85 Then, in light of such a national emergency or issue of extreme emergency, each
WTO member country has the right to grant compulsory licenses on any healthcare related
IP.86 Lastly, understanding that LDCs, with their inability to produce at large scale lifesaving
medicines, may need more than just the ability to grant compulsory licenses in their future
healthcare crisis, paragraph six grants member WTO countries the ability to find unique
solutions to this large scale production problem.87 This eventually lead to a series of
amendments culminating in the sixth amendment of the TRIPS agreement passed in 2017.88
This amendment to the TRIP agreement, which is binding on all WTO countries, authorized
compulsory licensed medications to be produced by a third party and exported to a least
developed or developing country.89 It is this amendment that has become of increased interest
in the last year given the plight of least developed countries and their lack of vaccine
manufacturing ability as the COVID-19 pandemic has raged across the world.90
2. Canada Law in Support of TRIPS Agreement
Canadians have a worldwide reputation of being friendly, polite, and social justice
oriented.91 It was in this spirit that the Canadians recently developed their “Access to
Medicine Regime” legislation.92 This program seeks to provide LDCs access to life-saving
vaccines and medication by compulsory license.93 Indeed, this Canadian program leverages
the WTO TRIPS sixth amendment authorization to award a compulsory license to a Canadian
manufacturer.94 In this way, the Canadian manufacture under the compulsory license, may
produce the vaccine and distribute it in an LDC that lacks the means to buy or create the
vaccine themselves.95 Canada was one of the first WTO member countries to pass legislation
to take advantage of the WTO TRIPS sixth amendment program.96 Although Canada was the
first country to implement legislation that took advantage of the TRIPs sixth amendment
agreement, Canada has yet to create an efficient mechanism for LDCs to take advantage of
this process.97 The Access to Medicine Regime requires Canadian congressional body
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approval to add any vaccine to its list of approved list. In doing so, Canada has necessitated
an expensive and lengthy political debate for each vaccine added.98
This congressional approval requirement has neutered the effectiveness of Canada’s
Access to Medicine Regime during COVID-19.99 As Bolivia was unable to procure a vaccine
via the free market, it decided to give the Canadian compulsory licensee approach a try.100 To
this end, Bolivia has contracted with a Canadian manufacturer to produce 15 million doses of
the Johnson & Johnson (J&J) vaccine.101 However, Canada’s government has yet to authorize
the J&J vaccine to be produced under this legislation.102 This means Bolivia, who applied
May 11, 2021, continues to be in bureaucratic limbo.103
Given the highly bureaucratic nature of the Canadian Access to Medicine Regime
program, the fickle nature of the Canadian government to place various items on the approved
list, and the lack of transparency in the process, Canadian Access to Medicine Regime has
proven not to be a viable way forward for Bolivia or any other LDC.104
3. U.S. Law in Support of TRIPS Agreement
In contrast to the Canadian legislative solution, which has been made ineffective via
a whitelist system, US law, is much more effective at accomplishing compulsory licensing.
Under US law, the government has the power to take the patent of a vaccine and use it as the
government sees fit. In line with the international TRIPS agreement, “The US government has
authorized the ‘taking’ of a non-exclusive and compulsory license to any United States patent
based on the theory of eminent domain,” per 28 U.S.C § 1498.105 Further, the taking of a
compulsory license occurs at the instant the invention is first manufactured by the
government.106 Thus, the US government may execute a taking by merely creating the
patented item with or without notice.107 Additionally, the government may contract out for the
vaccine’s production, and the manufacture will not be liable as they are merely an agent of the
US government.108 Therefore, it does not violate US laws to exercise amendment six of the
TRIPS agreement to contract out creation of a patented vaccine, which makes the exercise an
attractive option for LDCs attempting to get access to a vaccine.109
However, all is not lost for the owner of the patent “taken” by the US government.
The owner of the patent may seek relief for this non-exclusive compulsory licensing under 28
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U.S.C. §1498(a).110 This section “is a waiver of sovereign immunity only with respect to
direct governmental infringement of a patent.”111 If the owner of the patent can show direct
infringement, “relief may be provided for the ‘reasonable and entire compensation’ for the
compulsory non-exclusive patent license.”112 Per §1498, a patent’s direct infringement may be
demonstrated when the government has among other ways, uses or directly consented to the
manufacture of the patented vaccine for its benefit without obtaining a license.113 Relief is
usually determined to be a reasonable royalty which starts from the day of the taking, at an
interest rate set at the five-year bond rate on that day.114
Though the government has not exercised this option in the medical field, the
government has exercised this option numerous times in the name of national defense with
regards to ammunition, and other military relevant patents deemed integral to national
security.115 Thus, when worldwide manufacturing and distribution becomes a matter of
national defense during the next pandemic, it is probable the US will “take” a nonexclusive
compulsory licenses, contract out for its manufacture, and distribute it as far and wide as
necessary to ensure the safety of the US, with the royalty to vaccine IP holder be decided
later by the courts that will likely be far less than what was needed to justify the cost of
investing in vaccine discovery. This uncertainty of royalty payments to the IP holder injects
additional risk that the cost of development will not be outweighed by the compensation. As
such, a court ordered royalty payment after the country has taken the IP is an untenable longterm solution for the market.
IV. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION-INSPIRED SOLUTIONS
A. Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Quick Primer
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) allows parties to settle their disputes without
going to court.116 Though there are many forms ADR may take; arbitration and mediation are
the most common.117 Arbitration and mediation each provide unique tools for out-of-court
settlements.118
Arbitration is the more formal of the two forms of ADR and provides participants
with a binding settlement that is enforceable.119 Arbitration allows for things like limited
discovery with more relaxed rules of evidence that often allow for hearsay evidence.120 This
permits each party to present all the evidence they feel is necessary for a fair decision.
Further, the arbitrator may be an individual or a three-person panel chosen directly by
110
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participants or via a support organization like American Arbitration Association.121 This
allows parties to choose specific arbitrator(s) for their specialized knowledge of the industry
at issue.122 This industry specific knowledge enables the arbitrator to quickly grasp technical
details of the parties’ concerns to allow for a more speedy and nuanced settlement.123 Once
an arbitrator has heard all the evidence, the arbitrator will issue a binding judgment that is
enforceable domestically124 and internationally in over 160 countries125 via the Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards signed in 1958.126 Additionally,
arbitration is done at a fraction of the cost and time of litigation as the parties do not have to
wait for a court date or deal with time-consuming full length discovery processes.127 Thus,
arbitration is a speedy, cost-effective way to get an enforceable judgment from a subject
matter expert arbitrator.128
Mediation is a more informal alternative to litigation that is likely to be adhered to
as all parties had a hand in its creation.129 Mediators are usually chosen specifically for their
negotiation background rather than specific knowledge in a particular field.130 In this way, a
mediator leverage their negotiation skills on behalf of all parties to fashion a mutually
agreeable solutions.131 As each party has buy-in to this solution, the parties have a high
satisfaction rate of the outcome, which leads to a high level of adherence to the settlement.132
Just like in arbitration, mediation is a significantly cheaper alternative to litigation.133 Thus,
though mediation settlements lack the force of law, their high adherence rate make them an
excellent cost-effective alternative to litigation.134
B. Soft Power of Least Developed Nations using ADR in a Pandemic environment.
Mediation is an excellent tool for LDCs to flex their soft power to create access to
vaccine markets during the initial phase of the next pandemic. LDCs have three things they
may leverage during a pandemic in their efforts to get vaccines. First, it is in MDCs’ best
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interest to ensure the whole world is vaccinated.135 Second, vaccine manufacturers will want
access to the large markets in LDCs. Lastly, LDCs have the right to leverage TRIPS
agreement, Canada laws, and US laws for compulsory licensing.136 Given these leverage
points, LDCs should use ADR venues to create a settlement that is mutually beneficial for all
parties before the next pandemic hits.
1. Vaccination of least developed countries protects developed countries
Beyond the humanitarian reasons of preventing loss of life due to lack of
vaccination of LDC inhabitants, there is more egocentric reason why MDCs would want to
help LDC in this regard. LDC vaccination protects not only the citizens of the LDC, but also
inhabitants of MDCs because vaccination limits opportunities for the virus to infect new
individuals.137 The more people the pandemic has an opportunity to infect, especially in
countries with limited health care systems, the more likely a new variant will develop that
will compromise the effectiveness of current vaccines and medical treatments.138 As seen with
COVID-19 and its Delta and Omicron variants, mutated variants can occur quickly and be
more deadly139 or more communicable than the original strain.140 Therefore, not only is
helping the LDCs appropriate from a humanitarian perspective, it is also in the best interest of
the MDCs to ensure the vaccination of LDCs as quickly as possible.
2. Large Market Access of Least Developed Nations
The next leverage point an LDC should use is access to their country’s or region’s
large market. Vaccine creation is an incredibly expensive undertaking, requiring a large
market access for the creators to recoup their investment.141 Nearly 85% of the world’s
population do not live in a developed nation, so the large markets necessary for vaccine
developers to recoup their cost are the rest of the world.142 Further, given that an effective
vaccinee often only requires one dose and numerous people in developed nations with their
effective health care system choose not to get the vaccine at all, the developed nation market
gets saturate quickly before vaccine development cost may be recouped. However, LDCs
with their large populations and ability to ensure higher vaccination rates due to pent up
demand are promising markets for vaccination producer to earn back their vaccine
investments. To this end, LDC may be able to leverage access to their markets via
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government sanctioned monopoly in exchange for access to the vaccine during the initial
distribution phase.
3. International TRIPS Agreement
The next pandemic is merely a matter of time and the issue of initial vaccine access
for a LDC will again be raised. However, the next time this arises countries can have a plan in
place before hand via ADR negotiations. That is an LDC should work now to create an ADR
agreement that leverages their country’s ability to take the vaccine IP without adequate
compensation granted by the TRIPS agreements to create a vaccine development and
distribution settlement in preparation for the next pandemic. An ADR settlement like this,
with buy-in from all parties, effectively gets parties to commit to positive actions necessary to
enable LDC access to vaccinees in the next pandemic.143
C. ADR Settlement Options:
1. Option One: ADR to Codify Current Best practices of Status Quo
It is in the best interests of MDCs and LDCs to create a settlement that provides
access to vaccine markets due to LDC’s soft power of access to large markets, improved
efficacy of the vaccine when universal vaccination occurs in the setting of TRIPS and US
law-enabled compulsory licensing.144 This settlement would trade instant access to vaccines
that would cover the highest risk percentage of the country’s population for a long-term
monopoly of the least developed market once supply catches up to demand. This would
provide a legal pathway to protect the most vulnerable of a LDC without having to resort to
compulsory licensing taking. 145 Further, the settlement would pre-determine the reasonable
royalty rate for use of the non-exclusionary compulsory license without resorting to costly
ligation as seen in the Liberty case.146
In this case, the government was looking for a lead-free bullet, saw that Liberty had
created one and took the IP and began producing it themselves. After the governmental
taking, the royalty was established by the courts at a price that was likely lower than what
Liberty would have gotten had they pre-negotiated a price in an ADR venue. Though this is
an ammunition IP case, the principals would apply in a vaccine IP taking. In the setting of a
pandemic, vaccine creation and distribution can easily be made into a national security issue,
just as the lead-free ammunition was, that would justify governmental taking the vaccine IP.
However, if the vaccine IP is taken by the government, as seen in Liberty, the royalty rate to
be paid to the IP owner, which is set by the court looking at the totality of the facts on a caseby-case basis which would then include the fact the vaccines were given away in the name of
national defense may be determined to be set at less than half what the patent owner may
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think is appropriate.147 An ADR settlement that preempts this would reduce uncertainty
regarding national defense justified takings during the next pandemic.
2. Option Two: Flood Insurance Model
Knowing that pandemics occur periodically, a US flood insurance type model might
be an appropriate way to allow countries like Bolivia to overcome the high initial market cost
of a timely vaccine purchase. The US flood insurance model works by allowing and
sometimes requiring people who live in flood prone areas to purchase special insurance in
case of flooding.148 These insurance policies are provided directly by the US government but
may also be sold through private insurance companies.149 FEMA reports that for every dollar
spent on flood insurance in this way saves the US government six dollars in disaster relief
funding.150
Like with the flood insurance model, countries could pay an annual premium to an
insurance company.151 This coverage would then obligate the insurance company to purchase
a percentage of vaccine doses from approved sellers, up to a certain cost, during the initial
rounds of selling during the next pandemic. Given that periodicity of pandemics,152 the
insurance company would likely have roughly 100 years to prepare for its first pay out. This
would give insurance companies plenty of time to accrue premiums for participating
countries. Further, like all insurance companies they could invest those payments inquiring
modest low risk interest rate. Over time the insurance company could learn how to better
assess the risk individual LDCs have and adjust their premiums accordingly. Further, like the
US flood insurance program, this program could be underwritten by the Unite Nations, World
Health Organizations, or even the US.153
The flood insurance model might seem like COVAX. After all they would both be
third party nongovernmental agencies providing vaccine to LDCs. However, the flood
insurance would not rely on donors who might lose interest over time, or become concerned
about funding a program that could provide vaccine relief to a non-allied nation. A flood
insurance model would mitigate the politics of large donations and allow the program to be
self-sustaining.
Thus, an insurance program underwritten by an international organization, or even
the US itself, would be an excellent way to create an apolitical self-sustaining mechanism that
lowers the barrier to entry for LDCs to the initial vaccine purchasing market as seen in the
current COVID-19 pandemic.
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3. TRIPS enabled Long Term Sustainable Manufacturing Solution
A mediated settlement that enabled LDCs the ability to create a long-term
sustainable vaccine manufacturing solution would be best. A multilateral approach with
various stakeholders, from MDCs’ government officials to the pharmacology industry, with
various international organizations like Unite Nations, World Health Organizations, or even
the US., to create a vaccine manufacturing infrastructure in numerous countries ensures each
country could produce the necessary vaccine in event of a pandemic upon securing a
prearranged licensing agreement. When there was not a current pandemic that infrastructure
could be used to manufacture other vaccines (for polio, measles, smallpox, etc.) for local and
international sale. In this way, countries would enable themselves to be more self-sufficient
during the next pandemic, provide the world would have access to additional manufacturing
resources that will always be in short supply during a pandemic, and lastly provide an
additional source of revenue by producing regular vaccines while providing better
preventative health measures.
While continuing to seek a Canadian legislative solution, and further engaging in
negotiations with the US government, a LDC like Bolivia should also pursue a settlement to
enable their own manufacturing of the vaccine. Vaccine creators are already showing
unprecedented cooperation producing each other’s vaccines in their own facilities.154 It would
not be hard to go one step further and have those same vaccine creators work with least
developed nations to build out vaccine production and the associated logistics tail needed
within their nation.155 With the leverage of the TRIPS sixth amendment, the Canadian Access
to Medicine Regime program, and 28 U.S.C. §1498, along with the other previously
mentioned soft power of LDCs, it is in the vaccine patent holder’s best interest to create a
settlement that would allow a LDC to manufacture the vaccine directly in their country
without a compulsory license while providing control of the vaccine licensees to recoup their
investment at some level while increasing manufacturing capabilities in an interested least
developed nation like Bolivia.
V. CONCLUSION
The next pandemic is no more than a hundred years off. Though the COVID-19
pandemic has led to thousands of deaths worldwide, it has not led to billions of deaths as a
smallpox-like virus could have caused. Therefore, it is essential to plan now for that
contingency. Given these realities, US, UK, and EU vaccine creators must understand that
countries will do everything in their power to help the market develop a vaccine in the safest
and most timely manner. Possible negotiated plans need to be developed today to ensure the
protection of the vaccine developers’ IP while the entire world has initial access to the
vaccine. In doing so, future vaccinee developers will have a better understanding of the costs
and benefits of pandemic laded market and will be able to better use their resources. This will
provide the best opportunity for no country to be left behind in the initial dosage
procurements.
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